Class Project or Individualization?

The Stratification of Europeans' Transnational Activities

Jan Delhey, Emanuel Deutschmann and Katharina Richter

Abstract: In sociological research on transnationalism it is conventional wisdom that the upper strata are more involved in cross-border activities than the lower strata. At the same time, proponents of the individualization/death-of-class thesis have argued that the significance of inequalities for people's actions and lifestyles is declining in affluent societies. This article investigates the influence of inequalities on transnational activity. Using Eurobarometer 73.3 survey data from 27 European countries, it is examined (a) to which extent inequalities determine, in absolute terms and relative to heterogeneities, transnational practices within countries; (b) which macro-level characteristics explain differences between countries, and (c) whether affluence moderates the impact inequalities have on transnational practices. The findings show that inequalities matter more for transnationalism than other factors in the majority of countries. Affluence and country size are central macro-determinants of transnational activity.

Contact:
Prof Dr Jan Delhey
Professor of Sociology
Jacobs University Bremen
School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Campus Ring 1
D-28759 Bremen, Germany
j.delhey@jacobs-university.de

Table of Contents

1   Introduction

It is a widely-acknowledged fact that economies and organizations are ever more intercon-
nected internationally, as are individuals (e.g. Held, 2004; Castles and Miller, 2009). In reac-
tion, scholars have adopted cosmopolitan perspectives, and focus explicitly on emergent
transnational phenomena (for many others, cf. Chernilo, 2011; Amelina et al., 2012;). A sig-
nificant stream of research has developed around cross-border practices of individuals, such
as travelling, working and studying abroad, or reading foreign newspapers (e.g. Kuhn, 2011;
Recchi, 2012). A variety of terms have been proposed to denote these practices of late, in-
cluding grass-root transnationalism (Portes, 1999), transnational social integration (Delhey.
2004; Rippl et al., 2010), individual transnationalism (Kuhn, 2011), and social transnational-
ism (Mau, 2010). Our article connects to this line of research using the term *transnational
practices* to denote individuals' activities and experiences that go beyond nation-state bor-
ders.[1]

A recurrent theme in this literature is that the upper classes are far more transnationally
active than the lower social strata (e.g. Deutsch, 1953; Cocks, 1980; Sklair, 2001; Favell,
2008). This emphasis on inequalities has been echoed in particular for Europe (e.g. Mann,
1998; Mau, 2009). Perhaps most resonantly, Neil Fligstein has depicted European integration
as a 'class project' in his 2008 book *Euro-Clash*. However, the evidence provided is to date
still poor and inconsistent. How, for instance, do generational differences (the young are
more transnational throughout) fit into the 'class project' narrative? Are inequalities really
the one factor explaining transnational practices, as the dominant interpretations in current
literature suggest? Further, the importance of inequalities might vary across countries – an
issue that has not been tackled sufficiently up to now.

The emphasis on the class nature – broadly understood – of transnational activity stands in
stark contrast with both the 'death-of-class' thesis and the individualization theory, which
argue that individual socio-economic position, and class in particular, becomes ever less rel-
evant for people's actions in postmodern societies (e.g. Beck, 1992: 88). How are these two
contrasting notions reconcilable? Considering that class theory commonly identified inequal-

---

[1] This definition does not imply that actual *physical* borders have to be crossed. For example, having a friend
  from another country would also count as a transaction.

ities only as embedded within the nation-state (cf. Atkinson, 2007: 359), it is unsurprising that the ways in which inequalities play out for social behavior transcending nation-state boundaries are still underexplored.

The empirical research presented in this article explores questions precisely targeting the stratification of transnational practices in a cross-national comparative perspective: using Eurobarometer 73.3 survey data for 27 European countries, we examine (a) to which extent inequalities determine, in absolute terms and relative to other factors such as age and migration background, transnational practices; (b) which macro-level characteristics explain differences in transnationalism between countries, and (c) whether transnationalism is more or less vertically stratified in affluent postmodern countries.

This article is structured as follows: The next section outlines the relevant literature, in particular research portraying Europe as a class project on the one hand and research arguing for a diminished role of class on the other. The next section develops our research questions, followed by an introduction to the data and their operationalization. Thereafter, the empirical results are presented. Finally, the findings are discussed and summarized.

2 The class gap in transnationalism: diverging predictions

2.1 Europe as a class project

The idea that transnational practices are socially stratified has been advocated for a long time. In the 1950s, Karl Deutsch argued that participation in extended networks of communication was mainly a characteristic of the upper social strata, while the middle classes were just fairly and the lower classes barely involved: in other words, stratification follows a 'layer-cake pattern' (Deutsch, 1953: 170). Richard Münch (1993, 2001) maintains that the new opportunities created by open borders would mainly cater to the educated professionals who would create most bonds of organic solidarity with people in other countries. Leslie Sklair (2001) has described how business leaders, politicians, and experts form an emerging 'transnational capitalist class', which shapes the world according to its fashion. With a specific focus on Europe, much has been written about the European Union being driven by the self-interest of big-business capitalists (Cocks, 1980) or EU-bureaucrats and other political elites (e.g., Haller, 2008). Similarly, Michael Mann stated that the emerging single European society 'is much more a network of upper social classes and elites than of the masses' (1998: 205).

Qualitative research has identified a distinctive group of 'Eurostars' (Favell, 2008) and 'pioneers' (Recchi and Favell, 2009), i.e. especially transnationally mobile women and men (cf. Andreotti and Le Galès, 2011). Adrian Favell pointedly described them as well-educated 'elites in their flat world without borders, hopping between global cities and in a protected, golden space of flows, while the disenfranchised and disadvantaged masses remain trapped in their local, parochial environs, excluded from the world party' (2008: 83).

The book which touched upon the question of stratification of transnational practices in the most resonant way is probably Neil Fligstein's *Euro-Clash* (2008). It argues that 'doing Europe' – the active involvement in the various transnational social fields created through EU law – has a marked social imbalance: 'Europe so far has been a class project, a project that favors the educated, owners of business, managers, and professionals, and the young.' (Fligstein, 2008: 156). Other quantitative research has also found transnational activities to

be more common among well-educated, high-income professionals and managers (e.g. Mau 2009, 2010; Mau and Mewes, 2009; Díez Medrano, 2010).

Theoretically, there are good reasons for assuming a strong link between socio-economic position and transnational practices. First, it takes economic resources to travel or study abroad, and the upper social classes are more likely to have them. Second, transnational cultural capital, in particular foreign language proficiency, is a facilitator of many transnational practices (cf. Gerhards, 2010; Gerhards and Hans, 2013). Additionally, higher education furthers cognitive mobilization (Inglehart, 1970) and thereby increases the taste for variety. Research on cultural omnivores, for instance, has shown that the university-educated middle class has the broadest repertoire of cultural likes and activities (Peterson, 1992; Bryson, 1996; van Eijck, 2000). Therefore, transnational skills and experiences could also serve as new status markers that signal a high-brow life-style and demonstrate preeminence over lower-class locals (Meuleman & Savage, 2013; Gerhards, 2014). Third, many high-end jobs provide ample opportunities for business trips and international contact (Tannock, 2007). Professionals, managers and wealthy people in general tend to benefit from a conjunction of all these factors, and should therefore constitute the most transnational social stratum, the top layer of the layer-cake.

2.2 The individualization/death-of-class thesis

As plausible as the class project thesis is, it is useful to recall two largely overlapping sociological debates which both assume a generally *declining* influence of socio-economic position on people's behavior and worldviews, particularly in postmodern societies: the death-of-class thesis (the term commonly used in the US) and the individualization thesis (the term used in Europe).

Initialized by Clark and Lipset (1991), the death-of-class thesis purports that due to a series of major societal changes, traditional hierarchies are in decline. Trends such as individualization or growing affluence have 'stripped' class off its economic connotations, thereby effectively reducing its everyday significance (cf. Pakulski and Waters, 1996). In the affluent postmodern condition, Western countries are eventually shedding their class societal skin. Clark and colleagues (1993) conclude that although class remains a potentially influential

stratification mechanism, it is slowly eroding; concurrently, alternative mechanisms are gaining in relative salience vis-à-vis class:

> *"While class theories can illuminate many patterns, they must increasingly be supplemented by considerations of non-class-based hierarchies. This follows because, while class distinctions have become less rigid, other hierarchies, especially ascriptive ones like those based on sex, race or ethnicity, continue to polarize many countries of the world, differentiating them, for example, by residential location, educational opportunities, or of course by future class location" (Clark et al., 1993: 313).*

Under the term individualization, Ulrich Beck developed a very similar argument: "ties to a social class recede mysteriously into the background for the actions of people. Status-based social milieus and lifestyles typical of a class culture lose their luster" (Beck, 1992: 88). While inequalities still exist, their impact on what people do and think is greatly diminishing – a consequence of what Beck describes as the 'elevator effect', driven by growing affluence and educational expansion. Other scholars are less radical in their assumption how much significance inequalities will lose but expect a decline as well (e.g. Giddens, 1991; Habermas, 1998; Bauman, 2001).

The dissemination of the death-of-class/individualization theses was of a magnitude that led even canonical class researchers to concede that alternatives to class as an explanation for human action should be taken into account (Goldthorpe and Marshall, 1992). For Hans-Peter Kriesi, "the crux is to identify theoretically and empirically the relevant social divisions of a world in flux" (1998: 181). Numerous empirical studies have tried to disentangle the relative importance of class- and non-class mechanisms of structuration since then, dealing with a wide variety of sociological topics. The majority of studies have focused on political behavior and attitudes, commonly finding that 'new' social divisions such as age, gender, race, religious affiliation, or issue-based voting are significant, while evidence for the continued importance of class as a critical stratification mechanism remains somewhat mixed (e.g., Nieuwbeerta, 2001; Ansolabehere et al., 2006; Brooks et al., 2006;).

None of these studies has investigated transnational practices. Yet the general message is that it might be risky to assume class – and inequalities in general – to be the key social division in affluent societies by default. Rather, we need to evaluate to what extent inequalities structure people's life choices vis-à-vis alternative forces, especially ascriptive ones, if we desire a more accurate understanding of our world. The present article seeks to take on this

task, focusing on transnational activities of European citizens. In doing so, it will keep with Blau's (1977) distinction between inequalities to signify hierarchical stratification (class, education, etc.) and heterogeneities to summarize alternative, mainly ascription-based, social divisions suggested in the literature.

3 Deriving research questions

The literature discussed above leads us to contradictory conclusions: The death-of-class/individualization debate would suggest that in the most affluent countries, the predictive power of inequalities generally should be declining for people's attitudes and behaviors, which could also apply to cross-border activities. However, the construction of Europe as a class project implies that it is first and foremost inequalities that determine people's cross-border interactions. In order to make sense of these diverging interpretations, it is necessary to carefully extricate the actual role played by inequalities for transnational practices.

The previous empirical literature has – in contrast with the clear theoretical positions – been rather inconclusive on this matter. For instance, Fligstein's (2008) evidence is at times contradictory. According to his computations, some class differences are actually not significant, as a closer look at the book's appendix reveals: for example, higher income is not associated with travelling Europe more frequently (Fligstein, 2008: 164, Table 5A.7), and professionals do not have a more positive outlook on the EU than blue collar workers (Fligstein, 2008: 161, Table 5A.3). Moreover, the '+' and '-' signs used to denote significant effects conceal the small actual size of some of the effects, as revealed by the appendix. More generally, comparative evidence is still rare and the potential differences between countries in this respect are usually disregarded, as previous research either involves single-country case studies or pools respondents from EU member states. To overcome these shortcomings we formulate our first research question as follows:

> *RQ1: To which extent do inequalities explain the variance in transnational practices within the EU-27 countries?*

Merely confirming whether inequalities have an impact on transnational practices is insufficient in light of the death-of-class/individualization thesis introduced above. Rather, one needs to extricate the importance of inequalities relative to heterogeneities, such as age, gender, or foreign background. After all, age has been singled out as 'one of the strongest predictors of being European' (Fligstein, 2008: 141), and the younger generations have been

spotlighted as the most cosmopolitan groups (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2007; Olofsson and Öhmann, 2007; Pichler, 2008; Kuhn, 2011). Others portray migrants as the vanguard of transnationalism (Portes, 1999; Römhild, 2007; Pries, 2008). Such findings are incongruous to the idea of transnational practice being first and foremost a class project. Thus, our second research question puts the impact of class in perspective:

RQ2: Are inequalities more relevant for citizens' transnational practices than heterogeneities within the EU-27 countries?

With regards to transnational practices, much of the existing literature has not yet addressed the question of variation between countries, focusing exclusively on within-country differences based on individual-level determinants. An exception is the recent study by Mau and Mewes (2012), which examined country differences in social transnationalism and a number of potential macro-level determinants including country size, internationalization, and modernization. Using a much more comprehensive index of transnational practices and several additional independent variables, we test the robustness of their finding with our third research question:

RQ3: Which macro-level variables explain differences in transnational practices between the EU-27 countries?

We finally combine the micro- and macro-level perspectives by enquiring whether and in what way a country's standard of living (GDP per capita), which turns out to be the strongest macro-level predictor in our own analysis, moderates the relationship between inequalities and transnational practices. If the individualization thesis were correct, the 'elevator effect' in advanced societies should soften the effect unequal socio-economic positions have on people's lives. For example, gradients in subjective well-being are less steep in affluent countries, i.e. the differences between groups of people occupying different positions of the social hierarchy are smaller (Schyns, 1998; Delhey, 2004). Likewise, links between socioeconomic status and health outcomes (Mackenbach et al., 2008) and between occupational class and cultural consumption (Gerhards et al., 2012) are weaker in the highly developed societies. Insofar as transnational practices also follow this logic of equalization, the respective class gaps should be smaller in richer countries.

Yet, transnational practices have also been shown to reflect the seeking of better economic opportunities abroad (e.g., Glick-Schiller, 2009; Tilly, 2011). From this perspective, the class

gap could in fact be smaller in *less* affluent countries, where more people of the lower strata engage in transnational practices and where the upper classes use more traditional markers of social distinction. Thus, empirical evidence is needed to establish in how far national prosperity affects the link between inequalities and transnational practices, leading to our final research question:

> *RQ4: Do inequalities have a smaller or larger influence on transnational practices in economically better-off countries?*

4 Research design

We use the Eurobarometer 73.3 from March-April 2010 (European Commission 2010). It was conducted in all EU-27 countries, with approximately 1,000 respondents per country, except for Cyprus, Luxemburg, and Malta with about 500, and Germany and the UK with around 1,500 and 1,300 observations, respectively. All participants are EU citizens. We decided to exclude respondents who were born in a country other than their country of residence from the analysis in order to avoid a tautology, since first-generation migrants by definition partake in cross-border interaction. It should be kept in mind that due to this omission our test for the importance of non-class related characteristics can be considered conservative.[2] Our working sample consists of 24,879 respondents. Since the 27 countries differ sufficiently in affluence and other indicators of modernization, the idea of a waning influence of inequalities on transnational practices can be analysed by country comparison (cf. Gerhards et al., 2012).

4.1 Dependent variable

We measure transnational activity via a transaction index (TRACI) based on QB6, a battery of 12 questions that concern cross-border practices and experiences, such as holidays in other countries, working abroad, having foreign friends, and following foreign news, cultural life, and sports (cf. Table 1 for a full list of items). The items cover the most important dimensions of transnational practices (cf. the EUCROSS typology, as described in Hanquinet and Savage, 2011). They were recoded into dummy variables, with 1 indicating that the item applies to the respondent. An exploratory factor analysis revealed that only one factor has an Eigenvalue greater than one, with all items loading sufficiently high on this factor (.39 or

---

[2] In trial computations that included first-generation migrants, migrant status trumped class-related variables by far as a predictor of transnational practices.

higher).[3] To keep the index parsimonious, all items were summed up to form TRACI. Any individual can score between 0 (not a single transnational practice) and 12 (all 12 transnational practices). TRACI is by far more encompassing than the dependent variables used in earlier studies (e.g. Fligstein, 2008; Mau and Mewes, 2012).

No.	Item
1	**Lived abroad:** You have lived for reasons other than study or work for at least three consecutive months in another country than (OUR COUNTRY).
2	**Studied abroad:** You have attended school or studied for at least half an academic year in another country than (OUR COUNTRY).
3	**Worked abroad:** You have worked (including volunteering and traineeships) for at least three consecutive months in another country than (OUR COUNTRY).
4	**Foreign language:** You are fluent in at least one other language than (INTERVIEW LANGUAGE).
5	**Bi-national partnership:** You live or have lived with a partner of a different citizenship than your own.
6	**Friends from abroad:** You have close friends in (OUR COUNTRY) who have moved here from abroad.
7	**Friends abroad:** You have close friends who live in another country than (OUR COUNTRY).
8	**Relatives abroad:** You have close relatives (brothers, sisters, children, parents) who live in another country than (OUR COUNTRY).
9	**Foreign food:** You regularly eat food at home that is typical of another country than (OUR COUNTRY).
10	**Foreign news, culture, sports:** You regularly follow news, cultural life or sports from another country than (OUR COUNTRY).
11	**Holidays abroad:** You regularly spend your holidays/weekends in one particular country other than (OUR COUNTRY)
12	**Property abroad:** You own real property/ properties in another country than (OUR COUNTRY) (not timesharing)

Table 1: Items used in the transaction index (TRACI).
Note: obtained from EB 73.3, QB6

4.2 Independent variables, micro-level

On the individual level we differentiate between inequalities and heterogeneities as theorized by Peter M. Blau (1977). *Inequalities* always imply some form of status distance and denote stratification. We treat the four characteristics education, occupation, difficulties paying bills, and self-placement in society as inequalities. *Education* is measured as years in full-time education and consists of four categories: 'less than 15 years (of education)', '15-19

---

[3] The required minimum value suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) is .32.

years', 'more than 19 years' and 'still studying'. The higher educated can be expected to be more transnationally active. *Occupation* consists of six categories: 'self-employed', 'managers', 'other white collars', 'manual workers', 'retired', and 'others' (comprising house persons, unemployed, and students). If the class project literature cited above is correct, the first three occupational classes should be characterized by higher TRACI scores than manual workers. *Difficulties paying bills* (dummy variable, 1 = yes) is used as a proxy for income, which is not provided in the EB. People with difficulties paying bills should be less transnationally active, since crossing borders is often cost-intensive. For *self-placement in society*, respondents are asked to position themselves on a scale from 1 ('lowest level in society') to 10 ('highest level'). This might capture an additional aspect of stratification not covered by the three more objective variables.

For the most part of this paper we use these four variables individually, but for answering research question 4 we construct a latent variable (called *inequalities*) by conducting an exploratory factor analysis using the 'polychoric' command in Stata. Only one factor emerges with an Eigenvalue > 1 on which all four individual variables load with at least .39. Thus we attain a multidimensional measurement of socio-economic position that encompasses class and status, which is preferable to one-dimensional measures (cf. Goldthorpe, 2010). However, the polychoric command requires ordinally scaled items, forcing us to delete the categories 'still studying' from education as well as 'retired' and 'other' from occupation. As a consequence, the sample size for RQ4 is more than halved (dropping to 10,421). To mitigate the impact of this problem, we complement the argument with evidence from two individual inequality variables, self-placement in society and education, based on the entire sample.

Heterogeneities, per contra, refer to parameters that measure differences between groups without an inherent rank-order. We consider age, gender, rural/urban, and migration background. *Age* is measured in years; *age-squared* is additionally included because we assume a non-linear relationship with transnational practices, increasing into adulthood and then decreasing again, as the decrease of openness with age is well-documented (McCrae et al., 1999). *Gender* (1 = male) is considered as earlier literature has found that women are less transnationally active (Fligstein, 2008: 164). *Rural/urban* has three categories: 'rural area or village,' 'small/middle sized town,' and 'large city.' We expect city-dwellers in particular to have higher TRACI scores, as cities are generally more diverse places (Wirth, 1938) and pro-

vide more opportunities for contact with people from other countries. Finally, two dummy variables capture the *migration background*, one for second-generation migrants (defined as having at least one parent born abroad), and one for third-generation migrants (at least one grand-parent born abroad). People with migration background should be more likely to have links to another country via their relatives and should therefore score higher on the transaction index.

4.3 Independent variables, macro-level

The country characteristics that are of main interest for this study can be subsumed under the term socio-economic development. More specifically, the countries' *standard of living* is measured as the logarithm of the GDP per capita in purchasing power standards[4]; *transportation infrastructure* as the highway density in km/100,000 inhabitants[5]; *tertiary education* as the gross enrolment ratio of students in tertiary education[6]; and *economic and political globalization* via the economic (KOF_{econ}) and political (KOF_{pol}) sub-indices of the KOF Index of Globalization, respectively[7]. Generally, we expect socio-economic development to spur citizens' transnational activities.

Other country characteristics include the *country size* measured as the logarithm of the surface area in thousands of square kilometre[8], the *income inequality* measured by the GINI coefficient of income distribution, and the *length of EU membership* in years. Citizens of smaller countries are naturally more likely to transcend nation-state borders, as their radius of action would otherwise be rather limited (Babones, 2007; Mau and Mewes, 2012: 7). Concerning *income inequality*, Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) argue that many social gradients in behaviour that exist between the economically well-off and the poor are steeper in more unequal countries and it could well be that the same holds true for transnational practices. Including the *length of EU membership* in the analysis is a common strategy in EU Sociology (e.g. Anderson and Reichert, 1995): as citizens of long-standing member countries have been

---

[4] Values from 2011. Source: Eurostat
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00114, 28.8.2012). Using the logarithm of GDP per capita is a standard practice in econometric research (Michener 2003) and it makes sense for similar reasons here.

[5] Values from 2009/2010. Source: Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm¬/table.do-
?tab=table¬&init=1¬&language-=en&pcode=ttr00002&plugin=0, 1.12.2012). The ratio is calculated by dividing the total length of motorways through the population size.

[6] Values from 2002-2011. Source: UNDP (http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2013/, 12.2.2013).

[7] Values from 2009. Source ETH Zürich (http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/, 11.12.2012).

[8] Source: European Union (http://europa.eu/about-eu/facts-figures/living/index_en.htm, 28.8.2012).

part of a larger political community for a longer period of time, they had more time to establish bonds to people from other countries.

5   Methods

This paper combines several statistical modelling techniques. For answering the first two research questions, we run multivariate OLS regression models for each EU-27 country individually to compare the adjusted R-squareds (cf. Marks [2005] for an earlier application of this procedure). For RQ3, we look at bivariate correlations between country-level aggregate values. Finally, with regard to RQ4, we construct a set of random coefficient multi-level regression models, complemented by two conditional effect plots based on an OLS regression model.

6   Results

6.1   Descriptive findings

Figure 1 shows the distribution of TRACI scores in the EU-27 (pooled analysis). About a fifth (21%) of all Europeans is not transnationally active at all. Almost half of the Europeans (49%) report 1 to 3 transactions, a quarter (24%) 4 to 6 transactions. A small minority (5%) mentions 7 to 9 transactions, and less than1% reaches the highest values of 10 to 12. Hence, the


Figure 1. The distribution of TRACI scores

degree to which Europeans engage in transnational practices varies starkly and it consequentially makes sense to embark on a search for factors that account for these differences.

6.2   Pooled regressions

In order to prepare the answers to the first two research questions, three individual-level OLS regression models are run with TRACI as dependent variable (Table 2, M1-3). M1 includes only the four inequality variables. Transnationalism increases with education, higher occupational class (mangers, self-employed, and other white collar workers have higher scores than blue-collar workers), and a higher self-placement in society, while people who have difficulties paying bills are less transnationally active. All in all, in this pooled analysis 12.3% of the variance in TRACI scores is explained.

M2 contains only the heterogeneities discussed above as independent variables. They all significantly impact on social transnationalism. As predicted, there is a reverse U-shaped pattern for age that peaks at age 34. Men are more transnationally active than women, city-dwellers more than villagers, and people with a migration background more than those without. Taken together, the heterogeneities in M2 explain 7.8% of the variance in TRACI scores.

The last model, M3, contains both inequalities and heterogeneities. Most coefficients remain stable, except for the differences between retirees and blue collar workers and between small/middle-sized town dwellers and villagers, which become insignificant. The combined adjusted R-squared is 16.9%. The three models show that all individual-level variables have significant effects on transnational practices that go into the expected directions. This groundwork now allows taking on a comparative perspective which is at the core of our analysis.

	M1	M2	M3
Vertical			
Education			
16-19	0.503***		0.391***
	(0.04)		(0.04)
20+	1.438***		1.310***
	(0.04)		(0.05)
still studying	1.021***		0.878***
	(0.07)		(0.08)
Occupation			
self-employed	0.347***		0.344***
	(0.06)		(0.06)
manager	0.571***		0.518***
	(0.06)		(0.06)
other white collar	0.107*		0.104*
	(0.05)		(0.05)
retired	-0.253***		-0.056
	(0.04)		(0.05)
other	0.099*		0.153**
	(0.05)		(0.05)
Difficulties paying bills	-0.198***		-0.256***
	(0.03)		(0.03)
Self-placement in society	0.152***		0.153***
	(0.01)		(0.01)
Horizontal			
Age		0.028***	0.022***
		(0.00)	(0.01)
Age²		-0.000***	-0.000***
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender (1=male)		0.294***	0.201***
		(0.03)	(0.03)
Rural/Urban			
small/middle-sized town		0.147***	0.049
		(0.03)	(0.03)
large town		0.349***	0.190***
		(0.04)	(0.04)
Grandparents foreign-born		0.969***	0.861***
		(0.05)	(0.05)
Parents foreign-born		0.831***	0.836***
		(0.07)	(0.07)
Constant	1.102***	1.928***	0.485***
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.14)
N	22665	23519	21996
Adjusted R² (%)	12.3	7.8	16.9

Table 2. OLS regression predicting the TRACI score
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Omitted category for education: "15- years"; occupation: blue collar workers; Rural/Urban: rural area/village.* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

6.3 RQ1: The impact of inequalities

For answering this first research question, M1, M2 and M3 are run separately for each EU country, saving the resulting adjusted R-squareds. M1 delivers the *maximal* percentage of the variance in TRACI scores that can be explained by the inequalities, $R^2_{max}(inequalities)$, and M2 delivers the respective information for heterogeneities, $R^2_{max}(heterogeneities)$. We additionally calculate the *minimal* percentage of the variance in TRACI explained by inequalities by subtracting $R^2_{max}(heterogeneities)$ from the explained variance of M3 (inequalities and heterogeneities combined):

$$R^2_{min}(inequalities) = R^2(inequalities + heterogeneities) - R^2_{max}(heterogeneities)$$

Calculating the minimal and the maximal R-squared provides us with the range between which the actually explained variance lies. Next, this range is compared across the EU member states (Figure 2A). There are substantial differences between countries. While in Ireland 19-21% of the variance in TRACI can be attributed to inequalities, this is the case for merely 1-5% in Latvia. Inequalities also have a relatively great impact in Cyprus, Germany, Belgium,


Figure 2. Comparison of R-squareds across countries

the Netherlands, and Austria, but matter comparatively little in Lithuania, Italy, Estonia and Portugal. The unweighted EU average explanatory power of inequalities is 7-12%. Thus, while in all EU-27 countries inequalities do explain transnational activity to some extent, they do so much more in some countries than in others.

6.4   RQ2: Comparing the impact of inequalities and heterogeneities

To examine the strength of inequalities relative to heterogeneities, first the maximal and the minimal percentage of the variance in TRACI explained by heterogeneities is extracted for each country:

$$R^2_{min} \ (heterogeneities) = R^2 \ (inequalities + heterogeneities) - R^2_{max}(inequalities)$$

There are again major differences between countries (Figure 2B): while heterogeneities account for 11-19% of the variance in TRACI scores in France, they are responsible for only 1-3% in Ireland. The average across all EU countries lies at 6-10%, which is almost as high as for inequalities. But what matters more, inequalities or heterogeneities? To answer RQ2, we calculate the relative importance of inequalities, as compared to heterogeneities, by subtracting, for each country, the minimum explanatory power of heterogeneities (as shown in Figure 2B) from those of inequalities (as shown in Figure 2A).[9] The vertical line on Figure 2C demarks the point of equal importance; for the countries situated left of this line, heterogeneities are more influential for transnationalism than inequalities, whereas for the countries situated right of this line, inequalities are more important than heterogeneities.

In 15 countries, inequalities indeed matter more than heterogeneities for how transnationally people live, supporting the class project notion. Inequalities are particularly powerful in Ireland, Germany, and Cyprus, and to a lesser extent in Poland, the UK, the Netherlands, and Greece. However, in 12 countries, inequalities are *less* influential than heterogeneities and most clearly so in Estonia, Lithuania, Spain, and Latvia. This finding casts some doubt on the universality of the portrayal of European interconnectedness as a class project in the first place.

---

[9] For this step, it is mathematically irrelevant whether R^2_{min} or R^2_{max} is used, as the result is the same.

6.5 RQ3: Explaining between-country differences

To explore between-country differences in transnational activities, we first compare the country-mean transaction index scores ($\overline{TRACI}$). There is a substantial gap in transnational activity between European societies (Figure 3): Italians (1.2 transactions), Hungarians (1.6), and Poles (1.6) score lowest, whereas Maltese (3.9), the Dutch (4.2), and Luxembourgers (5.6) score highest. The Dutch are on average three and a half times more involved in transnational practices than the Italians, and the Luxembourgers even four times more.[10]


Figure 3. Mean TRACI scores across the EU-27

As a rule of thumb, Southern and Eastern European countries tend to be situated at the lower end of the distribution (Malta is an exception to this rule), while the Benelux and Scandinavian countries are situated at the upper end. This pattern suggests that socio-economic development is likely to be important. A second factor could be territorial size: most countries at the upper end of the distribution are small, whereas the large EU countries (Great Britain, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and Poland) are all situated in the lower half of the range.

To examine this issue further, Table 3 provides correlation coefficients between population-average TRACI scores and the set of country characteristics described above. Two aspects of

---

[10] Luxembourg is far ahead of the others, but this cannot be due to a 'Eurostar effect' as the working sample for Luxembourg – as for all countries in the EB – only contains EU citizens *born* in the country of residence. Hence, the foreign-born EU bureaucrats cannot push Luxembourg's TRACI score upwards, nor can the great many commuters from neighboring France and Germany working in the banking sector.

socio-economic development are particularly strongly correlated with transnational practices: standard of living (r=.64), and economic globalization (r=.59). Transportation infrastructure and political globalization are only tentatively significantly correlated with TRACI and the gross enrolment rate in tertiary education is, surprisingly, negatively correlated with transnational practices. Concerning the other factors, Table 3 suggests that smaller countries indeed have a more transnationally active population (r=-.65). In contrast, contextual inequality (income distribution) and the length of EU-membership have no significant effect on average levels of transnational practices.

Variable	Specification	$\overline{TRACI}$	R^2_{min} (inequalities)
Socioecon. development			
Standard of living	log GDP per capita	0.6397***	0.4094*
		(0.000)	(0.027)
Transportation infrastructure	highways in km/ 100,000 inhabitants	0.3288†	0.2377
		(0.082)	(0.214)
Tertiary education	gross enrolment rate in tertiary education	-0.4469*	-0.2912
		(0.015)	(0.125)
Economic globalization	KOF_{econ}	0.5880***	0.3047
		(0.001)	(0.108)
Political globalization	KOF_{pol}	-0.3246†	0.2753
		(0.086)	(0.148)
Other factors			
Country size	log territory in 1,000 km²	-0.6468***	-0.1051
		(0.000)	(0.587)
Income inequality	GINI	-0.1617	-0.1962
		(0.420)	(0.327)
Length of EU membership	in years	0.2658	0.3520†
		(0.164)	(0.061)

Table 3. Pairwise correlations with country-mean TRACI scores and variance in social transnationalism explained by inequalities (R^2_{min} (inequalities)), Note: †<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

The scatterplots in Figure 4 illustrate the relationship between transnational practices and its two strongest macro-level predictors, standard of living (Fig. 4A) and country size (Fig 4B), demonstrating how they complement each another. As Figure 4A shows, the more affluent a country, the more transnationally active are its citizens. Further, the countries above the regression lines are predominantly small – they have a more transnationally active popula-

tion than their standard of living alone would predict. In contrast, the countries below the regression lines are predominantly large. Figure 4B shows how, TRACI scores steeply decrease with country size. The countries located above the regression line are predominantly affluent, whereas those situated below the line are typically less affluent. Thus, standard of living and country size must be seen as central macro-level determinants of the degree of transnational practices.


Figure 4. National standard of living and country size as predictors of social transnationalism

6.6   RQ4: Affluence and the size of the class gap

Do affluence and country size also moderate the predictive power of inequalities? The third column in Table 3 which we have ignored thus far provides the correlation between the minimal percentage of the variance in transnational practices explained by inequalities ($R^2_{min}(inequalities)$) and the macro-level variables discussed above. There is only one significant factor: standard of living, with a positive sign.[11] The class gradient in transnational activities is steeper, not flatter, in affluent countries. Thus, there seems to be a triangular relationship between individual social class, national standard of living and transnational practices.

To investigate this further, we construct three random coefficient multi-level models (Table 4) with the latent variable 'inequalities' contained in the random part. We start with an emp-

---

[11] There is also a tentatively significant and positive correlation between the length of EU membership and $R^2_{min}(inequalities)$. However, we suspect that this is most likely a spurious effect, since the countries which joined the EU only recently are also less affluent (cf. Vobruba, 2003).

ty model without independent variables in the fixed part. The next model contains all heter-

ogeneities, 'inequalities' (the latent variable), as well as the two most central macro-level

variables standard of living and country size. In the final model, an interaction between

standard of living and 'inequalities' is added. The interaction term is significant, indicating

that the relationship between social class and transnational practices is moderated by the

standard of living of a country.

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Est	(SE)	Est	(SE)	Est	(SE)
Fixed Part						
Constant	1.063***	(.185)	-1.485***	(0.21)	2.035	(1.64)
Age			0.011	(0.00)	0.010	(0.01)
Age²			-0.000†	(0.00)	-0.000†	(0.00)
Male			0.134**	(0.04)	0.133**	(0.04)
Rural/Urban						
Small/middle-sized town			0.185***	(0.05)	0.186***	(0.05)
Large town			0.576***	(0.05)	0.582***	(0.05)
Grandparents foreign-born			0.774***	(0.08)	0.767***	(0.08)
Parents foreign-born			0.874***	(0.10)	0.877***	(0.10)
inequalities			0.681***	(0.04)	-1.338**	(0.45)
Country size			-0.333***	(0.07)	-0.319***	(0.06)
Standard of living			0.779**	(0.30)	-0.020	(0.35)
Standard of living*inequalities					0.450***	(0.10)
Random Part						
inequalities	0.552	(0.16)	0.018	(0.01)	0.007	(0.01)
Country-Level Variance	0.713	(0.27)	0.211	(0.08)	0.192	(0.07)
Individual-Level Variance	4.306	(0.06)	4.081	(0.06)	4.079	(0.06)
Observations	10691		10421		10421	
Groups	27		27		27	
Log Likelihood	-23076.127		-22166.426		-22157.473	
Wald Chi²			1038.21		1190.71	
(Df)			(10)		(11)	

Table 4. Multi-Level Regression predicting TRACI scores
Note: Omitted category for Rural/Urban: rural area/village. † p<0.1 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

As stated in the data section, the multi-level models presented in Table 4 operate with a

reduced sample size for technical reasons related to the construction of the latent inequality

variable. Specifically students and retirees are excluded which explains why the age effect that we found earlier (Table 2) has now mostly disappeared. In order to demonstrate that the triangular relationship between social class, national standard of living and transnational practices also exists in the whole sample, we examine it graphically for two exemplary inequalities, self-placement (ten categories) and education (three categories).

For both graphs (Fig. 5A and 5B), the same three patterns emerge: First, there is a substantial class gap as the higher social strata are consistently more transnationally active. Second, the more affluent the country, the higher is the average number of transactions, for all social strata. And third, the increase in transnational activity is steeper for the higher social strata and as a consequence, the class gap is bigger in more affluent countries.

If one dared to infer trends from this cross-sectional data, they would suggest that while all social classes become more transnational as the national standard of living rises, the upper classes do so at a faster pace than the lower classes. As a consequence, the stratification of transnational practices increases with national prosperity, despite all strata becoming more transnational. This finding contradicts the death-of-class/individualization hypothesis and supports the idea of Europe as a class project for the well-off countries.


Figure 5. The interaction between social class and national standard of living
Note: Conditional effect plots based on regression models that contain all variables in M3 (Table 2) plus the interaction between log GDP per capita and self-placement in society and the interaction between log GDP per capita and education.

7   Discussion and conclusion

This article examined the stratification of transnational activity within and between European societies, departing from two opposing theories – the class project account of EU sociology and the death-of-class/individualization theory. We would like to highlight four findings:

a) Although class-related social inequalities explain transnational practices in all EU countries to some extent, the prominence of their role differs starkly between European societies.

b) When inequalities are compared to heterogeneities (age, gender, rural/urban and migration background), the former account for more variance in 15 countries; in the other 12 countries, heterogeneities explain more variance in transnationalism than inequalities.

c) There are substantial differences between countries concerning the extent to which people are transnationally active. This is mainly due to differences in socio-economic development (especially standard of living and economic globalization), as well as the size of a country.

d) In the well-off European countries all social strata are more transnationally active – yet due to a steeper increase in transnational practices for the upper classes, class gaps in transnational activity are also greater.

How do these findings relate to the two conflicting ideas presented above, Europe as a class project and death-of-class/individualization? Our evidence shows that both positions are in certain ways too simplistic and have to be relativized. On the one hand, our findings challenge the dominant portrayal of Europeans' transnational activity as a class project. This narrative underestimates powerful divisions within societies other than class (most notably age and migration background), which in almost half of the countries turned out to be even stronger than the class divisions. It further neglects country-level determinants that influence the degree of transnational activity. Proponents of the death-of-class thesis thus rightfully drew attention to stratification mechanisms beyond class.

On the other hand, inequalities do matter more than heterogeneities in the majority of EU countries, and the class gap in transnationalism is larger in the most affluent societies, which supports the class project thesis and contradicts individualization theory. Contrary to what Beck (1992) and many others claim, social inequalities seem to play a greater (not smaller)

role precisely in the most affluent parts of Europe, at least for individuals' activities across nation-state borders. This stands also in stark contrast to the studies which did find rather egalitarian life-style patterns in rich societies, e.g. for cultural consumption (Gerhards et al.,2012).

We would like to discuss two possible explanations for the increasing class gap. The first one is derived from Bourdieu's idea of distinction: engaging in transnational activities possibly constitutes a new form of social distinction with which the upper classes consciously or unconsciously separate themselves socially from the lower classes (cf. Meuleman and Savage, 2013; Gerhards, 2014;). These new status markers are especially relevant for the upper strata in the rich countries, where cultural lifestyles are already rather egalitarian. This interpretation would also fit the general emphasis on experience as opposed to possession in postmodernity (e.g. Inglehart, 1977; Featherstone, 2007). In societies that have reached a certain material saturation, one could argue, distinction increasingly works via transnational activities rather than conspicuous consumption.

The second tentative explanation is a plainly materialistic one. Since many (though not all) transactions require some financial means and/or foreign-language proficiency, it is mainly the educated and well-off in the affluent societies that have the economic and the human capital to engage fully in transnational practices, which generates the widening class gap we detected. Neither of the two explanations can be tested with our data, but both seem highly plausible.

There are many directions for follow-up research, but two seem particularly interesting to us. First, we have analysed European countries only, but worldwide there are even bigger gaps in wealth, infrastructure, and communication technology, which suggests that contextual effects on individual transnationalism are even stronger on a global scale. At the same time, stratification patterns within societies could look very different outside Europe, for instance because poverty-driven transnational activities might constitute a larger share of all transnational experiences. This calls for comparative studies including non-Western countries.

Second, whereas the TRACI index used in this article is mainly composed of indicators of transnational *practices*, it would be worthwhile to extend the framework to include subjec-

tive forms of transnationalism, from territorial identification to cosmopolitan values and feelings of world citizenship. Comparing the social gradient of the experience- and worldview-based sides of transnationalism would be interesting as the latter are probably less sensitive to individual financial resources and contextual opportunity structures. Consequently, class gaps in subjective transnationalism could well be smaller than class gaps in objective transnationalism.

To sum up, we believe that going beyond the simple ideas of Europe as a class project and death-of-class/individualization allows for obtaining a more adequate depiction of the stratification of transnational life in Europe at the beginning of the 21st century. As inequalities in transnational activity seem to grow rather than to diminish with increasing economic well-being, the stratification of transnational activity will continue to be a salient issue in the years to come.

8 References

Amelina A, Nergiz DD, Faist T and Glick-Schiller N (2012) Beyond Methodological Nationalism. Research Methodologies for Cross-border Studies. New York: Routledge.

Anderson CJ and Reichert MS (1995) Economic benefits and support for membership in the EU: A cross-national analysis. Journal of Public Policy 15: 231-250.

Andreotti A and Le Galès P (2011) Elites, middle classes and cities. In: Favell A and Guiraudon V (eds): Sociology of the European Union. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 76-99.

Ansolabehere S, Rodden J and Snyder JM Jr (2006) Purple America. Journal of Economic Perspectives 20: 97-118.

Atkinson W (2007) Beck, individualization and the death of class: A critique. The British Journal of Sociology 58: 349-366.

Babones S (2007) Studying globalization: Methodological issues. In: Ritzer G (ed) The Blackwell Companion to Globalization. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 144-161.

Bauman Z (2001) The Individualized Society. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Beck U (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage.

Beck U (2007) Beyond class and nation: Reframing social inequalities in a globalizing world. The British Journal of Sociology 58: 679-705.

Beck U and Beck-Gernsheim E (2007) Generation global. In: Beck U (ed) Generation global. Ein Crashkurs. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, pp. 152-166.

Blau PM (1977) Inequality and Heterogeneity: A Primitive Theory of Social Structure. New York: Free Press.

Brooks C, Nieuwbeerta P and Manza J (2006) Cleavage-based voting behavior in cross-national perspective: Evidence from six postwar democracies. Social Science Research 35: 88-128.

Bryson B (1996) Anything but heavy metal: Symbolic exclusion and musical dislikes. American Sociological Review 61: 884-899.

Castles S and Miller MJ (2009) The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chernilo D (2011) The critique of methodological nationalism. Theory and history. Thesis Eleven 106: 98-117.

Clark TN and Lipset SM (1991) Are social classes dying? International Sociology 6: 397-410.

Clark TN, Lipset SM and Rempel M (1993) The declining political significance of social class. International Sociology 8: 293-316.

Cocks P (1980) Towards a Marxist theory of European integration. International Organization 34: 1-40.

Delhey J (2004) Nationales und transnationales Vertrauen in der Europäischen Union. Leviathan 32: 15-45.

Deutsch KW (1953) The growth of nations: Some recurrent patterns of political and social integration. World Politics 5: 168-195.

Diez-Medrano J (2010) A new society in the making: European integration and European social groups. KFG Working Paper Series No. 12.

Featherstone M (2007) Consumerism and Postmodernism. London: Sage.

Fligstein N (2008) Euro-Clash. The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gerhards J (2010) Mehrsprachigkeit im vereinten Europa. Transnationales sprachliches Kapital als Ressource in einer globalisierten Welt. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Gerhards J (2014) Transnational linguistic capital: Explaining English proficiency in 27 European countries. International Sociology 29: 56-74.

Gerhards J and Hans S (2013) Transnational human capital, education, and social inequality. Analyses of international student exchange. Zeitschrift für Soziologie 2: 99-117.

Gerhards J, Hans S and Mutz M (2012) Social class and highbrow lifestyle – a cross-national analysis. BSSE Working Paper No. 24.

Giddens A (1991) Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Glick-Schiller N (2009) A global perspective on migration and development. Social Analysis 53: 14-37.

Goldthorpe J (2010) Analysing social inequality: A critique of two recent contributions from Economics and Epidemiology. European Sociological Review 26: 731-744.

Goldthorpe JH and Marshall G (1992) The promising future of class analysis: A response to recent critiques. Sociology 26: 381-400.

Habermas J (1998) Jenseits des Nationalstaats? Bemerkungen zu Folgeproblemen der wirtschaftlichen Globalisierung. Politik der Globalisierung: 67-84.

Hanquinet L and Savage M (2011) Operationalisation of European identity, cosmopolitanism and cross-border practices. EUCROSS Working Paper No. 2.

Haller M (2008) Die europäische Integration als Elitenprozess. Das Ende eines Traums? Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Held D (2004) A Globalizing World? Culture, Economics, Politics. London: Routledge.

Held D, McGrew AG and Goldblatt D (1999) Global Transformations. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Inglehart R (1970) Cognitive mobilization and European identity. Comparative Politics 3: 45-70.

Inglehart R (1977) The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kriesi H (1998) The transformation of cleavage politics. The 1997 Stein Rokkan lecture. European Journal of Political Research 33: 165-185.

Kuhn T (2011) Individual transnationalism, globalization and Euroscepticism: An empirical test of Deutsch's transactional theory. European Journal of Political Research 50: 811-837.

Mackenbach JP, Stirbu I, Roskam AJR, Schaap MM, Menvielle G, Leinsalu M and Kunst AE (2008) Socioeconomic inequalities in health in 22 European countries. New England Journal of Medicine 358: 2468-2481.

Mann M (1998) Is there a society called Euro? In: Axtmann R (ed): Globalization and Europe. London: Continuum, 184-207.

Marks GN (2005) Cross-national differences and accounting for social class inequalities in education. International Sociology 20: 483-505.

Mau S (2009) Who are the globalizers? The role of education and educational elites. In: Meier L and Lange H (eds): The New Middle Classes. Globalizing Lifestyles, Consumerism and Environmental Concern. Dordrecht: Springer, 65-79.

Mau S (2010) Social Transnationalism. Lifeworlds Beyond the Nation-State. London: Routledge.

Mau S and Mewes J (2009) Class Divides within Transnationalism – The German Population and its Cross-Border Practices. In: Ohnmacht T, Maksim H, and Bergman M (eds): Mobilities and inequality. Surrey: Ashgate.

Mau S and Mewes J (2012) Horizontal Europeanisation in contextual perspective: what drives cross-border activities within the European Union? European Societies 14(1): 7-34.

McCrae RR, Costa PT, de Lima MP, Simões A, Ostendorf F, Angleitner A, Marušić I, Bratko D, Caprara GV, Chae, J and Piedmont RL (1999) Age differences in personality across the adult life span: parallels in five cultures. Developmental Psychology 35(2): 466.

Meuleman R and Savage M (2013) A field analysis of cosmopolitan taste: Lessons from the Netherlands. Cultural Sociology 7: 230-256.

Münch R (1993) Das Projekt Europa. Zwischen Nationalstaat, regionaler Autonomie und Weltgesellschaft. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Münch R (2001) Offene Räume. Soziale Integration diesseits und jenseits des Nationalstaats. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Nieuwbeerta P (2001) The democratic class struggles in postwar societies. In: Clark TN and Lipset SM (eds): The Breakdown of Class Politics: A Debate on Post-Industrial Stratification. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 121-136.

Olofsson A and Öhmann S (2007) Cosmopolitans and locals. An empirical investigation of transnationalism. Current Sociology 55: 877-895.

Pakulski J and Waters M (1996) The Death of Class. London: Sage.

Perry A (1993) Climate and weather information for the package holiday-maker. Weather 48: 410–414.

Peterson RA (1992) Understanding audience segmentation: From elite and mass to omnivore and univore. Poetics 21: 243-258.

Pichler F (2008) How real is cosmopolitanism in Europe? Sociology 42: 1107-1126.

Pieterse JM (1994) Globalization as hybridization. International Sociology 9: 161-184.

Portes A (1999) Conclusion: Towards a new world – the origins and effects of transnational activities. Ethnic and Racial Studies 22: 463-477.

Recchi E (2012) Transnational practices and European identity: From theoretical to policy issues. EU-CROSS Working Paper No.3.

Recchi E and Favell A (2009) Pioneers of European Integration. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Römhild R (2007) Migranten als Avantgarde. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 52: 618-624.

Pries L (2008) Transnationalisierung und soziale Ungleichheit. Konzeptionelle Überlegungen und empirische Befunde aus der Migrationsforschung. In: Berger PA and Weiß A (eds): Transnationalisierung sozialer Ungleichheit. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 41-64.

Rippl S, Bücker N, Petrat A and Boehnke K (2010) Crossing the frontier: Transnational social integration in the EU's border regions. International Journal of Comparative Sociology 51: 5-31.

Ritzer G (1996) The McDonaldization thesis: Is expansion inevitable? International Sociology 11: 292-308.

Schyns P (1998) Crossnational differences in happiness: Economic and cultural factors explored. Social Indicators Research 43: 3-26.

Sklair L (2001) The transnational capitalist class. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Tabachnick BG and Fidell LS (2001) Using Multivariate Statistics. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Tannock S (2007) Beyond national borders: Reframing the global brain drain debate. SKOPE Research Paper No. 73.

Tilly C (2011) The impact of the economic crisis on international migration: A review. Employment & Society 24: 675-692.

van Eijck K (2000) Richard A. Peterson and the culture of consumption. Poetics 28: 207-224.

Wilkinson RG and Pickett K (2009) Income inequality and social dysfunction. Annual Review of Sociology 35: 493-511.

Wirth, L (1938) Urbanism as a way of life. American Journal of Sociology, 44(1): 1-24.